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654 RABER tI. TUMIN 
[L. A. No. 21530. In Bank. Jan. 30, 195L] 
BERTRAND RABER, Appellant, v. SAUL TUMIN et ~.;), 
Respondents. '-", 
1; 
[1] Dismissal-Upon FaUure of Proof-When Motion Grantec1.-i' 
A nonsuit is warranted only when, disregarding eontlictiDl't} 
evidence, and giving to plaintiff's evidence all the value -to~ 
which it is legally entitled, indulging in every legitimate,,] 
inference which may be drawn from that evidence, the result ia0 
a determination that there is no evidence of sufficient aub-;' 
stantiality to support a verdict in favor of plaintiff. -
[2] Id.-Upon Failure of Proof-Appeal-On appeal froJD .. 
order of nonsuit, the appellate court JDust view the evidenee , 
as though judgment had gone in favor of appel1~t, and JDuat 
reverse if such a judgment can be sustained. . _ 
13J Negligence-Invitees-Duties Toward.-An electrical eontrae- ,-
tor invited to a store to determine the necessity of changes j{-f-< 
wiring is a business visitor toward whom the lessee and his 
servant JDust exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in &\1 
reasonably safe condition, or to warn of danger, and the dutj 'j 
1>1 not liJDited to.conditions known to be dangerous but e1tenc1a'~1 
to those which JDight have been found dli.DgerouS0Y e a-
ercise of reasonable care. 
141 ld.-ltes Ipsa Loquitur.-The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
three conditions: The accident must be of a kind which ordiw.( 
aarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligenCIII;> 
It JDUS~ be caused by au agency OT instrumentality within the' 
exclusive control of the defendant; and it must not have been i 
clue to any voluntary action or contribution on the pan ef,i 
the plaintiff.;j 
[6] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Falling Objects.-A condition to ap--~ 
plication of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur that the accident ) 
be of • JdDd not .,dinarily oeenrring .. the _hom .. of ..,.u-. ~ 
gence is satisfied, where an invitee in a store showrooJDia:: 
struck on the head by a falling ladder. .,; 
[6] leL-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Falling Objects.-Defendants' ex-, 
elusive control of a ladder which fell on plaintiff is sufficiently, 
f3] See 19 OalJur. 618; 98 Am.Jur. 754.J 
[4] Presumption of negligence, note 72 A..L.R. 95. See, also, 19_
/
i 
Cal.Jur 704: 38 AIn.Jur. 989. 
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Dismissal, § 70; [2J Dismissal, 
~81(3); [3) Negligenee, §73: (4,7) Negligence, US3; [5,6,8, 9l! 
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established, to permit application of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur, by evidence that one defendant entered into posses-
sion of the premises four hours before the accident and his 
employe had ~ommenced work therein about three days be-
fore; and. from such evidence it may be inferred that defend-
ants knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care could have 
discovered, the floor to be slippery, and that the ladder was 
standing upright thereon. 
[7] Id.-Rea Ipsa Loctuitur.-An injured person's inability, result-
ing fro~ his ignorance of the circumstances of an accident, 
specifically to identify, as between master and servant, the 
actively~' negligent person docs not deprive him of the aid 
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
(8] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-FalUng Objects.-A condition to ap-
plication of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur that the aecident 
was not due to plaintiff's voluntary action or contribution is 
satisfied, where it is shown that he had no contact with a 
ladder in defendants' control until it fell on him. 
[9] Id.-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Falling Objecta.-A condition to ap-
plication of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur that the balance 
of probabilities favor the conclusion that aD accident was 
. more likely than not the result of defendants' negligence is 
met, where they permitted a ladder, on premises within their 
_··---control;::;totltand .on a slippery floor nearly vertically against 
a wall, 'and shoulcl have foreseen the possibility of vibration 
:aDd. that the.1adder in such position would be dangerous to 
persons lawfully on the premises. 
[10] Id.-Nonsuit.-In an ... ction for injuries sustained when a 
ladder which had been standing upright against a wall fell on 
an invitee, the fact that it was found across plaintiff's un-
conscious body at an angle oblique to the wall does not justify 
a nonsuit on the ground that some agency outside of defend-
ants' control applied the moving force. since such conclusion 
does not follow as 8 matter of law. 
[11] Id.-Nonsuit.-ln an action for injuries sustained when a 
ladder which had been standing upright against a wall fell 
on an invitee, inconsistpncies in permissible inferences as to 
the relative position of plaintiff and the ladder present issues 
of fact which must be resolved by. findings and judgment, and 
not by an order of nonsuit. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Joseph M. Maltby. Judge. Reversed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment of 
nonsuit reversed. 




Linnell & Smith and Charles T. Smith for Appellant. 
Spray, Gould, Duckett & Bowers and Malcolm 
for Respondents. 
SCBA UER, J .-Plaintiff seeks to recover damages 
personal injuries. Named as' defendants are Saul 
who was the lessee of a store in which the injuries 
received, and Tumin's employe Endriss, a carpenter. 
the close of plaintiff's case the court granted the dejEen,daJltt"lII 
motions for nonsuit, and plainti1f appeals. We ,COJIlClli1U:..jj 
that as to both defendants the matter should have gone 
the jury. 
[1J The granting of a motion for nonsuit is wArralnt.f!d 
,. when, and only when. disregarding conflicting 
dence, and giving to plaintiff's evidence all the value to which ' 
it is legally entitled, indulging in every legitimate ' 
which may be -drawn from that evidence, the result is ' 
determination that there is no eviden<.'e of sufficient subi'taD~ 
tiality to support a verdict in favor of the plaintiff." (CtWd 
v. Boms (1930), 210 Cal. 200. 202 f291 P. 190) ; see, a.Iso, 
Golcef/ v. 8ugarman (1950), ante. pp. 152. 153 f222 P 
6651; BZumberg v. M. ~ '1'. Incorporated (1949), 84 __ """,,",,-, 
'"'226;229 [209 P.2d 1], and caseS there cited.) "Unless it 
be said as a matter of law, that . ,. no other reasonable 
'elusion is legally deducible from the evidence, and that 
other holding would be so lacking in evidentiary support that 
reviewing court would be impelled to reverse it upon appeal, 
or the trial court to set it aside as a matter of law, the trial 
court is not justified in taking the case from the jury."': 
(Estate of Lances (1932), 216 Cal. 397,400 [14 P.2d 7681 
[2J In other words, while in most appeals it is the duty 
the reviewing court to indulge every reasonable intendment 
in favor of sustaining the trial court, substantially the reverse 
is true when the appeal is from an order of nonsuit. In the 
latter case the appellate court must view the evidence 
though judgment bad gone in favor of the appellant, and 
ordE'r a reversal if sucb a judgment can be sustained. 
Stated in thE' light most favorable to plaintiff, the evidence 
may be summarized as follows: 
Plaintiff. an electrical contractor, aged 36, at defendant· 
Tumin's request went at about 1 :30 o'clock in the afternoon 
to a store in the City of Long Beach. which Tumin occupied . 
as lessee, in order to chE'<.'k for any changes that might be , 
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defendant Endriss, an employe of Tumin, hammering on 
a partition which divided the front, or "show room," of the 
store from the rear part thereof. The showroom was between 
16 and 17 feet wide with the front door approximately in 
the middle on the north side, and about 16% feet deep from 
the front. or north. wall. to the partition. After plaintiff 
tlnd Tumin had talked together for about 10 minutes someone 
from outside calJed to Tumin and he left the store; plaintifi, 
who was standing •• not very far from the center" of the show-
room. turned to leave the store and .. believes" that as he 
approached the front door he saw a ladder standing "almost 
vertically" uprigbt ag'ain!';t the front (north) wan at a point 
near the east wall; he was •• very close to the front entrance 
when J got knocked out"; hI' does Dot "remember falling 
down": he regained consciousness in the hospital. While in 
the store plaintiff saw no "boles in the 800r" or debris or 
"obstructions of any kind" iD his pathway; the floor "was 
110t so slippery" that he .. had difficulty bolding" his feet 
on tbe 600r; neither he. TumiD nor Endriss used the ladder 
while plaintiff was in the !Storp: DO one except plaintiff, Tumin, 
and Endriss was in the store: and Ii uring this period Endriss 
was standing on tbe 800r while working. 
Defendant Endri¥ testifit'd that he had begun working in 
thl.' !>tore for Tumin on the Friday prior to the Monday on 
which plaintiff was injured; that in addition to demolishing 
the partition on which he was hammering. his work for Tumin 
was to include the setting of showcases and wall fixtures 
that Tumin "had coming from another store"; that his 
hammering on the partition. which was 8 feet tall, caused it to 
"vibrate or to jump ... some"; the floor, of composition 
t;]r.. was slippery, heavily waxed, and he slid and slipped 
&l'vera} times and fell down on it; when he entered the store 
tbp ladder. which was a ship's ladder 8 feet long, with sides 
made of one by sixes and treads "possibly" of one by eights, 
ha.d been lying horizontally on its edge leaning up against 
the west wall of the store; he did not "remember" using. 
or observing anyone else use, the ladder; he heard, but did 
not see. plaintiff fall and discovered him lying near the east 
store wall with the ladder lying flat across his hips; plaintiff's 
head was approximately 6 feet west of the east wall and one 
foot south of the north. or front. wall, and his feet were nE'tlr 
the east wall; at the time of the accident the light was very 
good and no onE' else was in thE' store. Eudriss furthE'r 
testified as follows: .. Q. In this accident, when you were 
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working for Mr. Tumin, you helped him move some 
cases around, didn't you . . . A. Yes, that is true. 
wasn't simply carpenter work, it was some general 
man work, in addition to carpentering, although that 
the principal detail f A. That is the line of our work 
rally ... Q. Do you know whether or not on the day that: 
Mr. Raber was injured, that there was any object ofani~ 
kind or objects which were standing at any point in the! 
easterly half of the front store room or show room' A. -Not: 
that I recall." 
The facts as to how and when and by whom the ladder. 
was brought into the store, and as to by whom it was raised 
from a horizontal to a substantially vertical position, and who 
had charge of it, are not specifically shown, but we think the 
evidence hereinabove epitomized, considE'red with that here-
inafter discussed, is sufficient to support a finding that de-' 
fendants had possession of the store anel of the ladder and_ 
that they were exercising dominion over snch property . ., '; 
According to defendant Tumin he had just signed the 1 
lease and taken possesssion of the store between 9 and 10 
o 'clock in the morning of the day the accident occurred, and 
at that time saw the ladder lying on the floor along the west: 
wall of the store. --. 
The doctor who examined plaintiff at the emergency hos-
pital following the accident testified that plaintiff had suffered 
a fractured skull and that "I don't be1ieve it would be specu- i 
lation to say that this man lying there unconscious with 1 
abrasions on his head, and bleeding from his ear, that there 
had been a blow to the head." Plaintiff's wife testified that 
during the 14 years of their marriage plaintiff "has been 
very healthy. He has never been sick." 
[3] Plaintiff was a business visitor toward whom Tumin, 
together with the servant through whom he was a('tingo in 
altering the premises, "was obliged to exercisE' ordinary care 
to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition. or to 
warn ... of danger. The duty was not limited to conditions 
actually known ... to be dangerous, bnt extended also to 
conditions which might have. been found danjl:prous by the 
exercise of reasonable care. [Citations.]" (Blumberg v. 
M. & T. Incorporated (1949), supra, 34 Cal.2d 226, 229.) 
Plaintiff urges tbat the evidence justifies application of tht' 
res ipsa loquitur doctrine, and that the nonsuit was there-
fore improperly grantE'd (SE'E' Rj1ld.~ v. Wheadon (1942), 19 
Ca1.2d 458, 461 [121 P.2d 724j ; l'barra v. 8pangard (1944), 
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25 Cal.2d 486 [154 P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258]). Defendants' 
position is that any judgment against them would be untenable 
because based upon nothing more substantial than speculation 
and guessing (see Reese v. Smith (1937), 9 Cal.2d 324, 328 
170 P.2d 933]). 
[4] As declared in Ybarra v. Spangard (1944), supra, 
page 489, "The doctrine C)f res ipsa loquitur has three con· 
ditions: '(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily 
does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) 
it must be caused by an agency or instrnmentality within the 
exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been 
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part nf 
the plaintiff.' (Prosser, Torts, p. 295.)" A more detailed 
explanation of the applications. limitations and effects of the 
doctrine may be found in Dierman v. Providence Hospttal 
(1947). 3] Ca1.2d 290. 295 [188 P .2d 12) . It has also been 
more specifically pointed out that "the applicability of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur depends on whether it can be 
said. in the light of common experience, that the accirlent 
was more likely than not the result of their I defendull ts' I 
nC'gligence. [Citations.] 'Where no such balance of prob. 
abilities in favor of negligence can be found, res ipsa loquitur 
dot'S not apply.' (Pro~er on Torts [1941J, p. 297.)" (La.· 
Porte v. Houston (1948),33 Ca1.2d 167,169 [199 P.2d 665].) 
Weare satisfied that a permissible view of the evidence 
here meets the several elements of the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur as above depicted. [5] Certainly the accident ap. 
p<'ars to satisfy the first requirement: an invitee in a show-
room is not ordinarily, in the absence ·of someone's negligence, 
struck on the head by a falling ship's ladder; secondly, the 
evidence tends to show that the instrumentality-the ladder 
on the slippery floor in the showroom-was within the ex-
~lusivc control of defendant". 
[6] Although defendant Tumin testified that he had en-
tered into possession of the premises only about four hours 
prior to the accident, Endri"s stated that be himself had 
commenced "working on the job" of "demolishing" the par-
tition for Tumin some three days earlier. It may thus be 
inferred that the defendants were not only in control of the 
store and of the ladder, but had had control for a sufficient 
period of time to have discovered, by the exercise of reasonable 
care, the fact that the floor was slippery and that the ladder 
was standing" almost vertically" up against the store wall, if, 
indeed, the floor had not been polished, and the ladder had 
) 
" 
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>" not been placed in its almost vertical position, by 
both of the defendants during their work about the premil~ 
> [7] The fact that plaintiff is by the very cmlmJllStlLneii., 
under which he was injured unable to specifically identi:fjJ 
as between master and servant, the actively negligent 
does not deprive him of the aid of the doctrine of 
loquitur. (See Ybarra v. 8pangard (1944), IUpro, 25 
486, 490; Cavero v. Franklin etc. BenefJoZe,,' Soc. 
ante, pp. 301. 311 l223 P.2d 471}.) 
From plainti1l' 's testimony that he does not remember 
ing and that as he proceeded from near the center of 
showroom to a point near the front door (which was ant)1'Olt.1 
imately midway between the east _ and west walls) 
knocked out," considered with the further fact that p.llt.iJl1WfI 
was found on the floor with the ladder lying across his 
and suffering from injuries including a fractured skull 
resulted from a blow to the head. together also with the 
pertinent circumstances in evidence, it may be inferred 
the ladder (which had been standing near' the . eastwaU) 
and caused plaintiff's fall. rather than that plainti1f fell and' 
caused the ladder to topple. In view of the slippery ftoor 
the substantial weight of a man '!I-~1, the aplt)arently __ autll!.! 
. stantial weight of the ladder, and its position across 
'ti1l"s body, it cannot be said that plainti1f's position 
found precludes the inferences above suggested. . 
[8] As to the third element of res ipsa loquitur, 
enumerated, the test is met in that the evidence tends to show 
.. c that plaintift' had no contact with the ladder until it fell upon 
him as he was leaving the store. 
[9] Under the circumstances related it appears that the 
.. balance of probabilities" test has been met. It is a matter 
of common knowledge that a ladder, and particularly one of 
the size and apparent weight of that involved here, cannot 
be made to stand upright against a wall, on a heavily waxed 
composition tile floor, without some fastening or other special. I 
attachment, unless the bottom or foot of the ladder is at a point 
almost touching the wall itself. so that the ladder is actuany 
"almost vertically" upright (as plaintiff's testimony flug-
, gests) and thus in an inherently dangerous position from 
which it quite likely will topple forward from the top at a i 
small jar or vibration. Here it would seem that the owner ! 
of the ladder and premises. and the employe working therein. 
should have foreseen that vibration or a jar might be cautled 
by traftic on the street outside the store, by the hammering ! 
~-.; \ 
) 
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of Endriss on the partition, or even by the tread of persons 
walking about the store, and that placing or leaving the 
ladder substantially upright on the slippery floor would be 
dangerous to persons lawfully upon the premises. Certainly 
it seems to us that the balance of probabilities ·here suggests 
nrgligence on the part of the person or persons responsible 
for the ladder and the slippery floor, rather than that the 
accident was unavoidable or due to negligence of the plaIn-
tiff. Defendants, not plaintiff, were in control of the premises. 
[10] Defendants argue that the fact that the ladder was 
found across plaintiff's body at an oblique rather than a 
right angle to the wall against which it bad been leaning 
pstablishes that it "must have toppled over sideways" ratber 
than forward, and that "it is common human experience 
that a ladder . . . will not faB over sideways unless some 
outside agency supplies the moving force." However, the 
force of the contact between the falling ladder and plaintiff's 
head or other part of his body would in common experIence 
cause deflection from the initial direction of fall, and bence 
defendants' argument, however plausible, is not as a matter 
of law compelling, and, therefore, cannot sustain the nonsuit. 
[11] The fact that testimony tended to show that plaintiff 
was near-lhe-doorin-1:he-middle of the front wall and that the 
ladder was upright near' the east wall, but leaning -against the 
front wall, likewise cannot. support the nonsuit. Obviously 
the relative positions of the plaintiff ana of the 'ladder were 
to . some extent approximations. and inconsistencies in per-
missible inferences from the evidence present issues of fact 
which must be resolved by findings and a judgment rather 
than by an order of nonsuit. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a 
new trial. 
Gibson, C. J " Shenk, J " Carter, J" and Spence, J" con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting and Concurring,-I concur in ' 
the judgment insofar as it reverses the nonsuit in favor of 1 
defendant Tumin. The evidence is sufficient to warrant 
an inference that while plaintiff was walking across defend-
ant Tumill's showroom on bis way to the front door, a ladder 
fell away from the wall top end first, struck him on the 
hrad, and knocked him to the floor. Since a ladder would 
not ordinarily fall had it not been negligently placed or 
662 RABER v. TullIN 
left in an unstable position, and since plaintiff himself 
nothing to set it in motion, the doctrine of res ipsa 
may properly be invoked to justify an inference of __ , .• U" •• 
negligence against the person who had control of the 
and the premises where it was located. Defendant 
had such control. He was the lessee of the premises and 
the only person apart from his employee, for whose COIIIQ1JCU 
he was also legally responsible, who might either have VUl.,,~,e,~ 
the ladder in a dangerons positioni or failed to remove it 
such a position after taking possession of the prE!mises,._:+~ 
I cannot agree, however, that the doctrine of res 
loquitur should be invoked against defendant Endriss ...... '" .. 1 .... :\\1 
becanse he was one of the persons who could have placed 
left the ladder in a dangerons position. The doctrine is 
on probabilities. Defendant's control and the nature 
the injury mnst be such that reasonable men can COIICltlde 
that it is more probable than not that the canse of the ~ol'-,,, . ..01 
was negligent conduct on the part of defendant. 
v. Houston, 33 Ca1.2d 167, 169 [199 P.2d 665] ; Honea v. 
Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614, 616-617 [140 P.2d 369] ; see v .. "' ........ 
Torts, p. 297.) If there is equal probability that the 
could have been caused by the negligence of anyone 
or more persons, it is impossible to conclude that it was 
probably caused by one than another, and the dOctrine 
inapplicable. (Hernandez v. Southern California Gas 
213 Cal. 384, 388 [2 P.2d 360J ; Olson v. Whitthorne ct 8wan, 
203 Cal. 206, 208 [263 P. 518, 58 A.L.R. 129] ; Zentz v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., 92 Cal.App.2d 130, 133-134 [206 P.2d 653) j 
see Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 Cal.L.Bev. 
183, 196-198, and cases there cited.) 
Although the record is devoid of evidence from which 
can be determined which of the defendants was at fault, 
the majority opinion holds that the "fact that plaintllf is. 
by the very circumstances under which he was injured unable 
to specifically identify, as between master and servant, the ~ 
actively negligent person does not deprive him of the aid of1 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." Under the rule so enunci- ;1 
ated it is no longer necessary for a plaintiff to prove that it is .~ 
more probable than not that he was injured as a result of:1 
defendant's negligence; he need only prove that he suiIered .. ~ 
I 
an injury of a kind that does not ordinarily occur in the ab- j 
sence of someone's negligence and that defendant was one of .1 
various persons who could have been negligent. Although. ~ 
such a rule is supported by Ybarra v. 8pangard, 25 Cal.2dJ 
'1 
) 
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486 [1M P.2d 687, 162 .A..L.R. 1258], and CatJ.ro v. Franklin 
.tc. BenetJoZ.nt Soc., ant., p. 301 [223 P.2d 471], it is at 
war with the general principle that plaintiff must prove 
that defendant was negligent and that his negligence was 
the cause of the injury. Under the rule of the Ybarra case 
as here applied a plaintiff who has au1fered an injury of a 
kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of some-· 
one's negligence may establish a cause of action against an 
persons who had an opportunity to cause the injury. A 
plaintiff, for instance, who is struck on the head by a flower-
pot falling from a multistoried apartment building may re-
cover judgment against all the tenants unless the innocent 
tenants are able to identify the guilty one. (See YbtJrrtJ v. 
SpangIJrd, 93 Cal.App.2d 43,47-48 [208 P.2d 44:5].) 
Until the present decision, the rule of the Ybarra case hu 
been confined to the factual situation there presented. In 
that ease an unconscious patient suffered an unusual injury 
during the course of an operation, and the court held that 
he could invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur against 
all persons who took part in his treatment while he was un-
conscious. It was careful to point out, however, that it was 
not undertaking "to state the extent to which the reasoning 
of this Case may be· applied to other ~~ations in which the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is invoked. U (YbarrtJ'v:78pIJn----
gard,25 Oal.2d 486, 494 [1M P.2d 687, 162 AL.R. 1258].) 
In the exploding bottle cases, that reasoning has not been 
applied, and it has uniformly been held that before he may 
have the benefit of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must prove 
that the bottle was carefully handled after it left the control of 
the bottler. (Gordon v. Aztec Brewing Co., 33 Oal.2d 514, 
517.518 [203 P.2d 522]; Zentz v. Coca Cola BottZing Co., 92 
Oal.App.2d 130, 133·134 [206 P.2d 653]; McClelland v. 
Acme Brewing Co., 92 Oa1.App.2d 698, 699·700 [207 P.2d 
591].) Under the reasoning of the majority opinion, plaintiff 
could invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur against the 
bottler and any intermediaries without proving anything more 
than that he himself handled the bottle carefully. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur concerns a type of circum· 
stantial evidence upon which plaintiff may rely to discharge 
his burden of proving that his injury was more probably 
than not the result of negligent conduct on the part of 
defendant. When, as in the Ybarra case, however, the court 
permits recovery against defendants who plaintiff has not 
proved more probably than not caused his injury, ostensibly 
) 
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by extending the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is act:uaUY:1A 
setting up a new rule of law affecting the burden of .... ,,"' ........ 
There are situations where, either by the application of 
presumption or by shifting the burden of proof itself, it 
reasonable to require of defendant an explanation if he is 
escape a judgment against. him. Thus. when bailed 
»1'«:- lost or destroyed, it is reasonable to requir«:- th«:-
prove that the loss was not owing to his negligence. (f7eOf'fj, .. 
v Bekt'TIs Van cf. Storage Co., 33 CaJ.2d 834.839-841 (205 
1O!-l7].) Again. when a carrier has und«:-rtaken to carry 
pass«:-nger safely it is reasonable to enforee that duty by 
Quiring the carrier to explain an accident. (See Prosser. 
Rf'..'l Ipsa Loquitur Ul Californta. 37 CaI.L.Rt>v 183. 185.)( 
The relationship between an unconscious patient and those 
who have undertaken to treat him may also be one that. 
justifies placing the burden of proof on th«:- attendants if they. 
are to escape liability for an unusual injury inflicted while 
th«:- patient is unconscious. Only confusion can resu1t~ how-~ 
ner, if rules designed to shift the burden of proof or the 1 
burden of going forward with the evidence are treated aa~ 
rules governing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. ~, 
In Summers v Tice. 33 Cal.2d 80 f199 P.2d 1, 5 A.L.R.2d ' 
-1I]~-tbe-courf avoided this confusion by a forthright recogni-:' 
tion that when one of two negligent defendants injures the ", 
plaintiff and it is impossible for the plaintiff to prove Whicb-
1 one, it is reasonable to put the burden on each defendant of proving that it was not his negligence that caused the plain- ' 
tiff's injury. In the present cas«:-. however, there is no evidence 
that both defendants were negligent. It is hardly reasonable 
to place on defendant Endriss the burden of proving thatl 
his negligenc«:- did not C8?Se plaintiff's injury wh.en his .neg!i-'j 
gence has not been estabhsh«:-d. Moreover, there IS nothmg ID '1 
the relationship between plaintiff and defendant Endriss that , .. 41, .. justifies shifting the burden of proof from one to the other. .. 
Both were on thE" premisE's for the purpose of assisting de- ,.:; 
fend ant Tumin to prepare for the opening of business. Neither J 
bad a duty to make th«:- premises safe and neither had had ...• ~ 
anything to do with th«:- ladder. They were substantially in '.1· 
the same position. If defendant Endriss must explain the _, 
injury that befell plaintiff. plaintiff would be under the same 
burden had the ladd«:-r fal1en on Endriss. In other words, 
any plaintiff who suffer!; an injury of a kind that would not 
01"(li nil rily occur in the II bspn('e of !ilom«:-one's negligence may 
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to cause the injury, even if he bears no special relationship .... 
to plaintiff that justifies placing the burden of proof on him. 
The injustice of making an innocent person, who has not 
undertaken any special duty toward plaintiff, bear the burden 
of the latter's loss may be obscured in this case because there 
are only two defendants, one of whom was more probably 
negligent than not. The rule now stated in reliance upon 
the Ybarra case is not limited to such situations. In the 
Ybarra case there were six defendants and judgment was 
secured against all of them because none could account for 
the injury. (Yban-4 v. 8pangard, 93 Cal.App.2d 43 [208 
P.2d 445].) A resourceful plaintiff could ordinarily find 
more than two defendants. There might be more than one 
employee; a plumber, a carpenter, a glazier, a painter, or 
an electrician might have been upon the premises and had an 
opportunity to place a ladder nE'gligently; or a former tenant 
might have negligently left the premises in an unsafe con-
dition. The plaintiff could sue aU such persons, and once 
he had established that he suffered an injury that would not 
ordinarily occur in the absence of someone's negligence, the 
fact that he was "by the very circumstances under which 
he was injured unable to specifically identify . . . the actively 
negligent person [lWould] not deprive him of the aid of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." 
Edmonds, J., concurred. 
